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Chapter 7
the Inhuman and the Automaton
Exploitation and the Exploited in 
the Era of Late Capitalism
Katerina Kolozova
1. tHe dYAd: teCHnoLogY, tHe
AnIMAL And tHe InHuMAn
The radicalized dyad of technology and the organic, which I will term the 
“human-in-human,” resorting to the terminology of non-standard philosophy 
(Laruelle), homologous to and drawing on the idea of the cyborg (Haraway), 
cannot be reduced to a meaning or truth. François Laruelle’s human-in-
human is neither physical nor transcendental (or linguistic) but rather a radi-
cal hybrid of the two. In other words, the human-in-human that is a cyborg 
escapes philosophy or the reduction to a “truth of the real” as a real that 
pretends to be more real (perfect) than the real itself. By virtue of its deter-
mination-in-the-last-instance as a “radical dyad,” that is, a dyad constituted
by unilateral elements that do not establish a unity in the sense of dialectical 
reconciliation, sublation, or any other form of unification of the two constitu-
ents. The human-in-human is nonhuman or “inhuman” (Haraway), monstrous 
along with the animal, the machine and the darkness of the out-there insofar 
as it remains a radical hybridity or one that is philosophically unmediated. 
The real precedes signification and occupies the position of mere materiality 
(either physicality or machinic materiality) unilaterally situated vis-à-vis a 
signifying agency. This dual unilaterality is placed within a dyadic structure. 
The human radical constructedness grounded in—although not reducible 
to—the binary of technology and the organic (or “nature”) does not make 
it more rational, more “intelligent,” and less physical, less animal. Quite to 
the contrary, the kernel of hybridity does not contain a purely technological 
or rational purpose—it is as unruly, as meaningless, as “merely material” as 
the animal. The kernel of hybridity is the “lived” or the experienced without 
a subject, that is, the experiential or the presubjective “taking place.” The 
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hybrid is, therefore, an instance of the real that precedes language or the tran-
scendental. It is inhuman or, put in Laruellian terms, nonhuman. 
The first movement toward transforming it into a meaning, elevating it 
into a form which plays a role in an organized universe (= philosophy), is a 
movement toward humanization aligned with the Enlightenment project. The 
latter represents a metaphysical project consisting in a secularized version of 
the theological-philosophical idea of humanism and the role of nature (and 
reason) in it. In other words, the non-philosophical approach to the idea of 
humanity and the role of technology in its constitution, regardless of whether 
conceptualized in terms of the classical humanist tradition or in the posthu-
manist one, is the necessary condition for transcending the anthropocentric 
naturalization of technology. Non-philosophy identifies the inhuman or the 
nonhuman real as the identity in the last instance of being human or of par-
ticipating in the “species being” (Marx) of humanity. One of its first names is 
human-in-human, a non-philosophical designation which refers to humanity 
without humanism whose agency can also be called nonhuman (analogous to 
Haraway’s inhuman).
Humanity is a theologico-philosophical creation, and it is always natural-
ized. Thanks to philosophy and theology, nature is always humanized. As 
long as the technological component of the radical dyad called the cyborg can 
be humanized or transformed into pure transcendence constituting the only 
accessible reality (= pure rationality), it is neither monstrous nor inhuman. It 
is not posthuman either. It is profoundly humanist. As a consequence, it will 
also be naturalized. The rationalist mind determined by its anthropocentrism 
in the last instance will unavoidably mimic and reproduce nature. Therefore, 
in spite of the commitment to hybridization, it will never be inhuman or 
monstrous. The inhuman is that which escapes rational conceptualization, 
that which has no meaning or reason for existence: senseless, brute existence, 
mere matter regardless of whether it is organic or artificially produced. 
The technological extension and the biological body are both alien to 
subjectivity, which is essentially and unavoidably a philosophical creation. 
In other words, subjectivity is always already philosophical. It is nothing but 
the automaton of signification which represents the human or constitutes it as 
representation; what makes it (non)human is precisely its failure to fully rep-
resent. Technology precedes subjectivity—just as the body does—and it can-
not, therefore, have an ontological status—it is prephilosophical. It precedes 
it as téchne (τέχνη) precedes philosophia (φιλοσοφία). It is the real vis-à-vis 
the subject of language. The hybridization of the two constitutes a category of 
society or the “species being” of humanity. Perfecting the imperfect nature—
because “irrational”—cannot be its purpose since the idea that nature contains 
meaning or sense, that is, a certain causa finalis, is theological-philosophical. 
In order for something to be susceptible to perfecting, it should contain the 
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tendency to be perfect. Minimally, it should be grounded in the possibility to 
constitute a meaning, a purpose. It should contain a telos, that is, it should be 
a theological category.
A Marxist position with regard to technology is a non-philosophical one. 
That is why Marxist science does not envisage an ontological status for tech-
nology. According to the historical and materialist (without philosophical 
materialism) science of Marxism, technology is a function of the social repro-
duction of the species-being (of humanity). Technology represents one of the 
two constituents of the radical and nonhuman dyad as the determination-in-
the-last-instance of humanity. As it is a social function it does not constitute 
an ontological substance. In metaphysical terms, it is not ousia but something 
closer to tropos. That is why, in the last instance, technology is the prosthesis 
of the organic. Together they represent a nonhierarchically constructed radical 
(= dialectically insolvable) duality as the determination of the species-being. 
Contemporary capitalism is enabled by the absolute rule of pure specula-
tion over the inhuman or the nonhuman kernel, not just the physical. How-
ever, the organic or the physical is the component of the inhuman binary that 
is fully objectivized and unilaterally exploited with technological means. It 
is exploited by the automated capitalist speculation by means of technology, 
rather than by “technology itself.” It also alienates the technological from the 
species-being in order to exert violent exploitation of the physical in the form 
of “resource,” either as labor force or as mere material to be used in industrial 
mass production. The realization of automated reason is surplus value and, 
in a more optimistic variant, simply value. In other words, its realization is 
yet another category of the specular, that is, of value. Speculative automated 
reason is essentially philosophical and exploitative of the physical or the 
organic, regardless of whether it is naturally created or synthetic. It does not 
have existence outside the self-enveloped and philosophically determined 
reality of the speculative mind or automation out of joint.
2. ALIenAtIon of LAbor tHrougH AbStrACtIon
The value of commodities is the very opposite of the coarse materiality 
of their substance, not an atom of matter enters into its composition. 
——Karl Marx, Capital
Marx unmasks the complete lack of materiality as the condition for deter-
mination-in-the-last-instance of commodity qua commodity. The product of 
human labor assumes the status of a commodity only when it is absolutely 
detached from its physicality. 
Gangle&Greve_9781786602459.indb   93 2/21/2017   3:49:11 PM
94 Katerina Kolozova
There is a physical relation between physical things. But it is different with 
commodities. There, the existence of the things quâ commodities, and the value 
relation between the products of labour which stamps them as commodities, 
have absolutely no connection with their physical properties and with the mate-
rial relations arising.1
The production and exchange of commodities is grounded in an estrange-
ment from the physical. The estrangement first takes place in the form of
the exploitation of human labor as physicality; and then in a second gesture, 
by way of entering the endless (or circular) chain of exchange of values, it 
assumes the status of a commodity. The second gesture would not be possible 
without the first. There is a direct causal relation between the two. The abstrac-
tion from the physical and its specular recreation as a sign, or a value—ergo 
a commodity—is the determination-in-the-last-instance of capitalism and 
philosophy. Such a gesture of abstraction is fundamentally political—it is a 
sovereign’s act of instituting a law and a reality stemming from that law. It 
is an act of instituting a reality as an act of substituting the “imperfect” and 
meaningless (viz., imperfect) real. In short, I refer—as Marx did previously—
to the legislating function of abstraction, not the cognitive faculty of abstract 
thinking. In capitalism, the latter has been extended into a plane of metaphys-
ics and transformed into an ideological instrument. It has, thus, been recreated 
according to philosophy and can no longer be theoretically or scientifically 
approached according to the norms of cognitive science, in particular psychol-
ogy. Abstraction-as-capitalism is an acceleration of the determination-in-the-
last-instance of philosophy, as defined by Laruelle—the amphibology that is 
established between truth and the real in the form of “the Being” (to ōn).2
Abstraction as the determination-in-the-last-instance of all commodities, and 
of the circulation of commodity as pure value (or “surplus” value) is enabled by 
the exploitation of human labor, which, in its turn, is always physical. 
The mystical character of commodities does not originate, therefore, in their use 
value. Just as little does it proceed from the nature of the determining factors 
of value. For, in the first place, however varied the useful kinds of labour, or 
productive activities, may be, it is a physiological fact, that they are functions 
of the human organism, and that each such function, whatever may be its nature 
or form, is essentially the expenditure of human brain, nerves, muscles, &c.3
It seems that exploitation is in essence and unavoidably “fetishistic” (in the 
sense used by Marx in the first volume of Capital) insofar as it is the effect of 
abstraction directed against the physical. Immediate needs that are expressed 
in and satisfied through the so-called use-value of a product are in the last 
instance physical, including when they primarily concern the “mind” (or brain 
and nerves). Only if these physical needs are sacrificed, and if they become 
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subject to the holocaust of speculation (economic but also philosophical), is 
a commodity created, and with it the possibility of surplus value.
A close reading of most of Marx’s seminal texts discloses a repeated and 
consistent stance according to which exploitation is always already carried 
out by the speculative and the abstract against the physical, or the real and/
or the material (all three terms are used by Marx interchangeably). This argu-
ment constitutes the core of his critique of fetishism. It is also, I would argue, 
the grounding epistemic position of his entire oeuvre. All questions that do 
not depart from the real of existence, or simply from the lived, are ill posed 
and lead toward speculation based on the procedure of abstraction.
Your question is itself a product of abstraction. Ask yourself how you arrived at 
that question. Ask yourself whether your question is not posed from a standpoint 
to which I cannot reply, because it is wrongly put. Ask yourself whether that 
progress as such exists for a reasonable mind. When you ask about the creation 
of nature and man, you are abstracting, in so doing, from man and nature. You 
postulate them as non-existent, and yet you want me to prove them to you as 
existing. Now I say to you: Give up your abstraction and you will also give up 
your question.4 
The “material” that Marx invokes as the authority in the last instance of every 
operation of thought, which seeks to establish accurate knowledge of reality, 
is “material” insofar as it is “physical,” “sensuous,” and “real.” It is unequivo-
cally stated so in Marx’s first thesis on Feuerbach: 
The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism—that of Feuerbach 
included—is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form 
of the object or of contemplation, but not as a sensuous human activity, practice, 
not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was 
developed abstractly by idealism—which, of course, does not know real, sensu-
ous activity as such.5
Human activity, particularly human subjectivity, is not reducible to physical 
activity. In the above quote Marx resorts to such terms as “the thing,” “real-
ity,” and “practice,” as different names for the same referent. Physicality only 
vouches that the object of cognition is not an abstraction: that it is anchored 
in the real.
3. MArX’S reALISM And tHe StAtuS
of MAterIALISM In It 
In his “Theses on Feuerbach,” Marx argues for a materialism that is not the 
product of an idea one can find in the history of philosophy. What Marx 
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advocates is a particular kind of materialism that is not philosophical, one that 
is not the product of operations of abstraction, or that is detached from and 
oppositional to the physical. Rather, he strives to create a science of human-
ity’s “species-being” that is determined-in-the-last-instance by the imme-
diacy of an experienced reality. Countering and transcending the experience 
of suffering caused by alienation is the goal that Marx’s political project 
seeks to attain. Materialism is merely a form of realism for Marx; he argues 
for it insofar as it departs from “the thing”6 and the “sensuous human activity, 
practice.”7 The antithesis between matter and idea here is also one imposed 
by abstract—or philosophical—contemplation. The goal of humanity then, 
according to Marx, should be emancipation from all forms of oppression and 
subjugation. This depends on the abolishment of antitheses established by 
the “abstract” or “false consciousness.” It can be accomplished by rooting 
thought in practice, or in the real. 
We see how subjectivity and objectivity, spirituality and materiality, activity 
and suffering, lose their antithetical character, and—thus their existence as such 
antitheses only within the framework of society; we see how the resolution of the 
theoretical antitheses is only possible in a practical way, by virtue of the practi-
cal energy of man. Their resolution is therefore by no means merely a problem 
of understanding, but a real problem of life, which philosophy could not solve 
precisely because it conceived this problem as merely a theoretical one.8
The chief concern of Marxism is ensuring realism rather than materialism. 
Transcending intraindividual and interindividual alienation is—Marx puts 
very explicitly—about abolishing the opposition between “spirituality” and 
“materiality.” The opposition itself—or the “antithesis”—is “merely a theo-
retical one.” The use of “theoretical” here has the same function as that of 
“philosophy” in Laruelle’s non-philosophy or non-standard philosophy. 
4. A SoCIALISt reApproprIAtIon of ALIenAtIon: tHe
reAL of joY And SufferIng In tHe groundIng SLIt
In non-philosophy, enjoyment and suffering no longer establish opposition. 
They are both instances of the lived, of the sheer experience that takes place 
as “suffering,” in the etymological sense of the Latin word passio. One is sub-
jected to a sensation, be it pleasure or pain, which takes place in the defense-
less body through the instance of pure exposure and vulnerability. Similarly, 
Laruelle’s “the lived” is called le joui, regardless of whether it is the product of 
the infliction of pain or pleasure. “It is the undivided (of) pain—yet not deter-
mined by it—as the undivided lived of joy, but never their synthesis, not even 
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immanent.”9 The unilateral, mute instance of the lived in Marx’s text is called 
suffering, regardless of whether it is the result of violence or a sensation of 
pleasure. “The object is the manifestation of the human reality . . . it is human 
activity and human suffering, for suffering, humanly considered, is a kind of 
self-enjoyment of man.”10 Suffering is self-enjoyment, not because of some 
vague masochistic inclination, but because it represents a sublimated alienation 
to which the self belongs intimately. Pain situates us in the real of ourselves. 
The real is the instance one inhabits prior to any “making sense out of it”; in 
anteriority vis-à-vis language, it precedes any possibility of abstraction (includ-
ing that of “abstract activity and a belly”). Laruelle’s “joui sans jouissance”11 
is one of the “first names” of the real that we all are in the last instance. It is 
the enjoyed, without the idea of “enjoyment,” without conceptualization or a 
philosophy of enjoyment, without attaching to it any sort of value. 
That invasion of sensation, whether undergone as pain or pleasure, is suf-
fering since it entails unmitigated exposure. Without the subject of language 
that transforms it into representation, phantasm, or ideal, it is helpless pas-
sivity. Nonetheless, if the lingual subject introduces abstraction to the extent 
of causing a sense of estrangement from the real that we are, or the bundle 
of sensations that each of us is in his/her last instance, we are subjugated and 
repressed, since we are detached from our most immediate physical needs. 
Abstraction or self-subjugation by philosophy is the only means through 
which we can become accomplices in our subjugation with others. 
According to Laruelle’s nonstandard psychoanalysis—operating with the 
“transcendental material” of Lacan’s psychoanalysis—the instance of the 
“Stranger” (or the process of estrangement as presubjectivization) is unavoid-
able and necessary in order to mediate the traumatic immediacy of the real. 
Laruelle says: “The Strangers are radical subjectivities,” rather than “persons, 
individuals or subjects in the technical transcendental sense of the word.”12 
Laruelle’s stranger is made of “transcendental material” since it is a form of 
subjectivity, or the product of language (regardless of how transcendentally 
minimal). Nonetheless, it also is radical since it is experienced as a “point 
of exteriority” at the heart of the real. Unlike Lacan’s barred subject, radi-
cal subjectivity—namely the stranger (as defined by Laruelle)—possesses a 
“concrete body” or “flesh,” one consisting of the “multitudes of transcenden-
tal material.”13 Thus, the experience of estrangement, which is an instance 
of suffering that takes place through the real that we are, must not be erased 
through a double abstraction—that is, an abstraction of and alienation from 
the presubjective and the founding experience of estrangement (of subjectiv-
ity). The process of alienation from the immediacy of the real—through the 
instance of the stranger or radical subjectivity—introduces the trauma of the 
foundational split. The pain of that unavoidable split is inalienable; it takes 
place in or as the real. 
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If recognized as a dyad that is constituted by thought’s unilateral position 
with respect to the real and by the indifferent (to thought) unilaterality of the 
real, and if this dyad is radically determined as such, the instance of alienation 
remains an exteriority. To radically determine the dyad as such and think it and 
its constitutive elements in terms of this radicalization is to perform an act of 
“dualysis,” which is the founding methodological procedure of non-philoso-
phy (and/or of non-standard philosophy). In that way, thought is not collapsed 
into and surreptitiously identified with the real of the pain that is caused by 
the experience of auto-alienation, namely the primordial split. “Dualysis,” in 
Laruelle’s terminology, is a procedure of unilateral affirmation of the dyad.14 
The nonabstractionist (or non-philosophical) recognition of the grounding 
alienation of the Self is radical, that is, it does not introduce a philosophical 
double of the reality of alienation that would constitute a modern subjectivity. 
5. Auto-ACCeLerAtIon of CApItALISM AS
SpeCuLAtIon And tHe AutoMAton of
SIgnIfICAtIon (produCtIon of vALue)
According to Marx in Volume 3 of Capital, the inherent laws of the capitalist 
political and economic order will nourish and exacerbate the contradiction 
between pure speculation as the primary mode of operation of capitalism 
and the material it aims to control and exploit. Speculation is production of 
representation, or of value including both surplus and use-value, whereby the 
latter—insofar as it is a value, that is, an estimation, rather than the practice 
of use—is just a derivative of “surplus value.” Value is always surplus value 
even when anchored in the practice of use. The automaton of signification—
value creation—is unstoppable and self-sufficient, whereas the intervention 
of the real (or the mere material) is an intrusion of the senseless into the 
automated production of sense, namely value. Speculation out of joint will 
assume a life of its own, detached from the material possession of capital as 
private property or as simply having actual money. Speculative capital, the 
capital with which the finance industry operates today, is potential money, 
pure speculation.15
Contemporary finance capital, or the so-called finance industry, relies and 
profits from the operations of circulation as a process per se and as tautology, 
divorced from any grounding in the material basis of capital. The “capital” of 
the contemporary finance industry is “information,” “knowledge,” and politi-
cal power.16 According to Marx, such a development is necessary and inevi-
table as the last stage of capitalism producing a “new financial aristocracy, 
a new variety of parasites in the shape of promoters, speculators and simply 
nominal directors; a whole system of swindling and cheating by means of 
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corporation promotion, stock issuance, and stock speculation. It is private 
production without the control of private property.”17 This stage is metastatic 
for capitalism, ensuing into the greatest and most productive contradiction 
that should lead to self-dissolution. 
What our contemporary media and corporate political powers call “crisis” 
seems to be, by all of its constitutive characteristics, the final stage of capital-
ism which Marx describes as “self-dissolving.” It unveils the reality of eco-
nomic production and social and technological progress as unfolding virtually 
independently from the “material basis” (monetarily represented materiality) 
of private capital. 
The acceleration process, which is bound to happen through what Marx 
called “the credit system,” the ever-growing distance between actual pay-
ing and buying of a commodity, and the possibility of an ever-expanding 
“intermission” of the credit period, divulges the spectrality of capital, 
money, and private property. Acceleration through the “credit system” 
as the final stage of capitalism is announced and elaborated by Marx in 
Volume 3, Chapter 5 of Capital. As the US Government Report on the 
2008 financial crisis shows, Wall Street CEOs do not have to invest any 
real or actual private property, and practically no capital of theirs has to 
be invested in order to initiate, manage, and profit. Quite the contrary, it is 
the private property of the poor that had been invested and then defaulted 
as the post 2007 crisis occurred. By no material investment of one’s own 
investment, “industrialists” create an unstoppable growing capital that 
enables them and the government to control the society as the highest form 
of politico-economic power. The illusion of capital’s materiality and mate-
rial property, serving as the basis for an economy, has become apparent 
through the financial speculation whose final form has come down to sheer 
swindling. Albeit aiming only at pure profit and exploitation of the poor, 
the crisis has also unwittingly shown that the “emperor had been naked” 
for quite some time—that capital as the material and real basis of economic 
processes is a mirage. On the basis of this particular contradiction, the 
“stock exchange managers” have managed to amass most of the material 
resources for themselves. 
Acceleration is immanent to capitalism. Capitalism is unstoppably accel-
erated by the inherent laws of speculation itself, and therefore that of 
dematerialization.
On one hand, the acceleration is technical; for example, with the same mag-
nitude and number of actual turnovers of commodities for consumption, a 
smaller quantity of money or money tokens performs the same service. This is 
bound up with the technique of banking. On the other hand, credit accelerates 
the velocity of the metamorphoses of commodities, and thereby the velocity of 
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money circulation. . . . Acceleration by means of credit, of the individual phases 
of circulation or the metamorphosis of commodities, later the metamorphosis 
of capital, and with it an acceleration of the process of reproduction in general. 
(On the other hand, credit helps to keep the acts of buying and selling apart lon-
ger, and serves thereby as a basis for speculation.) Contraction of reserve funds, 
which may be viewed in two ways: as a reduction of the circulating medium on 
the one hand, and, on the other, as a reduction of that part of capital which must 
always exist in the form of money.18
Acceleration does not take place in the form of finance capital only, but also 
in the area of material production, that is, in technological-militaristic devel-
opment. The unstoppable development of the means of production, which 
is also the means of exploitation of the (non)human and animal species, is 
constantly accelerated. It’s called technological development. Technological 
development is subject to private property, its goal is the creation of surplus 
value; inventions are in the possession of capitalist oligarchs exclusively. 
The imagined political revolution via technological acceleration requires a 
reversed model of ownership and reinvention of the social role of techno-
logical development. In order to achieve these goals, following the model 
of associations of producers advocated by Marx, the technological processes 
should be appropriated by the actual producers. As a consequence, this will 
lead to a replacement of the spectrality and superfluity of capital (money) by 
real and tangible social reproduction. 
In what Marx announces as the late stage of capitalism, that is, in finance 
capitalism, the process of signification—of turning a material, physical good 
into market value or commodity—is mainly carried out through mere “swin-
dling.” In this process, the “private ownership of property” has been proven 
to be “just ownership” as Marx predicted—a mere instance of the material to 
be exploited by the “stock exchange managers.” As the essentially specula-
tive nature of the capitalist economy has accelerated, the central contradic-
tion has moved to an extreme. According to Marx, the contradiction taken 
in extremis must be resolved by self-dissolving the impossible, unsustain-
able, contradicting couple. If the unsustainable and bubbled up speculative 
aspect of the contradiction culminates, if it exacerbates the fissure with the 
real and the physical that it introduced in principio, it will founder as the real 
starts to “act on its own,” escaping the control of philosophy (= ideology of 
capitalism). Unruly as it is, thanks to its brutal, physical force, and/or the 
force of the real, which can include material actions carried out by inanimate 
agencies, it will disperse the ruling webs of meaning, or the existing uni-
verse consisting of “estimation of values.” Such a process would lead to the 
self-dissolution of the founding binary of capitalism, because the reality is 
constituted by, grounded in, and conditioned by social process, rather than 
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capital investment (in the form of actual monetary assets). The materiality 
of contemporary reality lies in society, in its physicality and the effects of a 
conditioning real, rather than in the symbolism of money.
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